II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 1014
Cases Examining § 1014's Predecessor Statutes
The predecessor statutes of 18 U.S.C. § 10149 were designed to prevent banking fraud in a wide variety of contexts." The first reported case involving a false statement made to a federally insured lending institution was McClanahan v. United States," where the defendant was convicted of violating § 31 of the Federal Farm Loan Act." Meade McClanahan had applied for a loan using an application form supplied by the Federal Farm Loan Board, which was designed to elicit information to determine the advisability of making a loan to the applicant.1 3
McClanahan provided false information in response to several of the queries on the application. 4 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, McClanahan argued that the statute criminalized any false statement, however immaterial or unrelated such statement was to the transaction, and was therefore unconstitutionally broad. 5 He based his materiality argument on the contention that Congress did not have the constitutional power to criminalize "merely immoral" actions. 6 In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit determined that the application form had been designed to require an applicant to provide only in-formation material to the determination of the applicant's eligibility for a loan. The court therefore concluded that immaterial information does not provide the basis for a prosecution under the Federal Farm Loan Act. 18 In the second reported case involving a predecessor statute of § 1014, United States v. Kreidler, 9 the defendant was indicted for making a false statement to the Home Owners' Loan Corporation in violation of § 8 (a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933.20 A. L. Kreidler challenged the validity of his indictment on several grounds, including materiality. 2 ' He claimed that a false statement had to be "material and calculated to deceive" to constitute an offense under § 8(a).22 As in McClanahan, the Kreidler court determined that "a statement made to influence the whim of some officer of the corporation... would not support the charge [of criminal wrongdoing] .,, 23 Rather, the statement "must be relevant and material. 24 The court concluded that the false statements made by Kreidler were relevant to the Home Owners' Loan Corporation's application process and overruled Kreidler's demurrer to the indictment. 20 Section 8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 provided that: [w] hoever makes any statement, knowing it to be false, or whoever willfully overvalues any security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation of the Board or an association upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, or repurchase agreement, or loan, under this Act, or any extension thereof by renewal deferment, or action or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a) (1934 Owners' Loan Act of 1933.27 Kay overstated by two to four times her claims against a second mortgage." Kay argued that because the Home Owners' Loan Corporation never approved or made a loan to her, her false statement was irrelevant, and she therefore could not be convicted of violating the Act.2 The Supreme Court disagreed: making a false statement with the intention of deceiving the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is a criminal act, regardless of the Corporation's ultimate decision whether to grant the loan. 3 0 The Court thus held that reliance is irrelevant in a § 8 (a) prosecution.
The Creation of § 1014 in 1948
As part of its reorganization of the federal criminal code in 1948, Congress consolidated thirteen statutes criminalizing false statements made to federally insured lending institutions, thereby creating § 1014. Ten of the predecessor statutes did not contain a materiality requirement, 33 while three explicitly 2' Id. at 3. See supra note 20 for the text of § 8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act. Kay also appealed her conviction for violating § 8(e) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, but those arguments are not material to this Note.
28 Kay, 303 U.S. at 5.
29 Id " Id. at 5-6. As the Court explained:
It does not lie with one knowingly making false statements with intent to mislead the officials of the Corporation to say that the statements were not influential or the information not important .... Whether or not the Corporation would act favorably on the loan is not a matter which concerns one seeking to deceive by false information. Id.
S1 Id.
32 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994) . '3 See7 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false... for the purpose of influencing"); 12 U.S.C. § 981 (1946) ("knowingly mak[ing] any false statement in an application for a loan"); 12 U.S.C. § 1122 (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of obtaining.., any advance"); 12 U.S. C. 1123 (1946) ("willfully overvalu[ing] any property offered as security"); 12 U.S.C. §1248 (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement.., knowing the same to be false"); 12 U.S.C. § 1312 (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of obtaining"); 12 U.S.C. § 1313 (1946) ("willfully overvalu [ing] any property offered as security"); 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false ... for the purpose of influencing"); 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a) (1946) (same); 15 U.S.C. § 616(a) (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false.., for the purpose of obtaining... or for the purpose of influencing").
criminalized only material false statements.' The new section authorized the prosecution of "[w] hoever knowingly makes any false statement or report.., for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [a federally insured lending institution] upon any application, advance, discount, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan." 35 Those convicted could be fined "not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 3 6 Although all thirteen predecessor statutes contained different punishment provisions, the punishment prescribed by § 1014 was deemed "adequate for the offenses described" by the statute. 7 The consolidated statute contained "changes ... in phraseology to secure uniformity of style, and some rephrasing was necessary, but.., was without change of substance," except for changes in provisions relating to punishment3 Section 1014 did not contain an explicit materiality requirement, nor was materiality mentioned in the Reviser's Note.
Cases Examining § 1014
In the fifty years since the consolidation, virtually every circuit that examined § 1014 prior to Wells held that materiality is an implicit element of the offense.
Only the Second Circuit has refused to recognize an implicit materiality requirement in the statute. 4 ' The rationale for implying a materiality requirement was that "otherwise the statute would punish harmless attempts-that is, the making of a false statement incapable of influencing a bank-and this would greatly expand the potenSee 7 U.S.C. § 1026(a) (1946) (making a "material representation"); 12 U.S.C. § 596 (1946) (making a "material statement"); 12 U.S.C. § 1138d(a) (1946) (making a "material representation").
"18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1948) . "Section 1014 has since been amended to allow fines of up to $1,000,000, imprisonment for not more than 30 years, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1996) .
"See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
'9 See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1996) ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994 tial reach of the statute, with few benefits that we can see. ' 0 The circuits that implied a materiality element considered a statement to be material if it had the capacity to influence a bank or lending institution when evaluating a loan application. 43 Courts thus clearly saw an implicit materiality requirement as a necessary element of the false statement offense. Prior to Wells, the United States Supreme Court examined the offense elements of § 1014 in only one other case." Williams v. United States involved a complicated check-kiting scheme and presented the Court with the issue of whether passing a bad check constitutes a "false statement" within the context of § 1014. 45 In answering that question in the negative, the Court defined two "propositions" that the Government must establish in order to convict a person for violating § 1014:46 (1) the Government must demonstrate that the defendant made a "false statement or report, [or] willfully overvalue [d] any land, property or security;, 4 7 and (2) the Government must establish that the defendant did so "for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [a described financial institution] upon any application, advance,... commitment, or loan." 4 8 Because there was no question that the checks were material to the allegations, the Court did not include proving the materiality of the false statements among the required propositions. 49 The Government argued that a bad check should fall within the definition of "false statement." 0 The Court disagreed, noting that the Government's interpretation of § 1014 "would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law.""' Indeed, "any check, knowingly supported by insufficient funds, deposited in a federally insured bank could give rise to criminal liability., 52 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend for § 1014 to amount to a national bad check law and de- (I]f, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be voked the principle to strike down a criminal conviction. 62 Kirby was one of several defendants charged with violating a federal statute which criminalized knowingly and willfully obstructing the passage of mail. 6 ' The conviction stemmed from an incident in which Kirby, the county sheriff, arrested the local mail carrier, who had been indicted on a murder charge, while the latter was engaged in his official duties. 64 The Court determined that the law should not be applied against Kirby because:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.
5
The Court determined that common sense dictated that Congress did not intend for the statute to apply in this situation and reversed Kirby's conviction.6
In more recent years, the absurd result principle has been used infrequently but consistently. 67 Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) .
At the time of Green, Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (a) provided that: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. FED. R. EVID. 609 (a) (1989) . Rule 609 (a) was subsequently amended to remedy the problem identified in Green. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1997).
69 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
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609 (a) applies only in criminal actions. F Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, wrote that looking at the potential "bizarre disposition" of the case was sufficient for the Court to determine that Rule 609 (a) did not apply in a civil action. 7 ' It is thus accepted practice for the Court to look at the potential result of a natural reading of a statute and to reach a different conclusion if such a reading of the statute's text would be absurd.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Jerry Wells and Kenneth Steele had a history of participating together in business ventures. 72 In early 1986, the owner of Doss Office Systems, Inc. (Doss), a lessor and servicer of photocopy machines, approached Wells and Steele and offered to sell them the company. 73 Because neither Wells nor Steele had any knowledge of the copier leasing and servicing business, they asked Jim Russell, Doss's then-vice president of sales, to join in the venture. 74 Russell agreed, and in May of 1986, the three men assumed control of Doss, which they renamed Copytech Systems, Inc. (Copytech).75 Russell assumed control of most of' the day-to-day operations of Copytech; Wells and Steele later became involved in those functions only after Russell began experiencing emotional problems. 75 From the outset, Copytech had severe financial difficulties that required prompt attention. 7 7 Copytech had a serious cash flow problem, as well as more than $8 million in outstanding debts. 78 In order to obtain the cash necessary to keep Copytech afloat, the new owners assigned Copytech's rights to anticipated income from equipment lease payments to banks in exchange for a lump sum payment. 79 Id. The lump sum payment was equal to the present value of the income stream of a 60 month copier lease, discounted to yield the bank a 13-15% profit. Id.
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which the lease fees were calculated to include both the fixed costs of the equipment and the variable, or "soft," costs of servicing the equipment.s When Copytech sold its income interest in a CMP lease to a bank, Copytech retained the obligation to pay the "soft" costs incurred under those leases.' In some instances, Wells, Steele and Russell, along with their spouses, had to sign personal loan guarantees to cover those costs. 2 Copytech's financial difficulties were exacerbated by the state of its relations with several banks in the Kansas City, Missouri, area. 83 For example, to protect itself against potential default by Copytech, Boatmen's Bank of Kansas City required Copytech to maintain a cash reserve account equal to 15% of the value of all of Copytech's outstanding leases, approximately $500,000.84 Late in 1986, after Copytech overdrew on its account at the First State Bank of Joplin (First State Bank), the company ended its relationship with Boatmen's Bank and consolidated all of its accounts at First State Bank.m This freed $500,000 to cover the overdrafts, as well as other expenses, because First State Bank did not require Copytech to maintain a cash reserve account.as A third bank, Norwest Bank, also offered in 1986-87 to purchase CMP contracts from Copytech, but demanded that Copytech keep a reserve account similar to the closed account at Boatmen's Bank. 7 Copytech did not want to lose its limited financial flexibility by tying up significant amounts of money in a reserve account and consequently declined Norwest's offer.88
Copytech's cash flow difficulties persisted despite the company's financial maneuvering."' In an effort to obtain cash for Copytech, and to avoid having to tie up cash in a reserve account, the owners of Copytech misrepresented to banks their 80 Id. "Soft" costs were the expenses related to using copiers, other than the monthly rental fee, such as maintenance and replacement parts. various service commitments. 9° Copytech drafted new CMP lease agreements that gave the lessees responsibility for the upkeep of the leased equipment. 91 The revised CMP contracts were signed in conjunction with separate service addenda, which shifted maintenance responsibilities back to Copytech. 92 The company then sent the CMP leases to its funding sources without enclosing the service addenda, thereby concealing Copytech's service and maintenance obligations. 93 Having no direct knowledge of Copytech's ongoing service commitments, the banks continued to fund Copytech without requiring the company to maintain cash reserve accounts. 9 4 At the same time, however, the banks knew that Copytech's relationships with its customers involved more than just the equipment leases because CMP customers paid the lease and service contract fees to the banks in one monthly payment." Any money over and above the monthly lease payment fee received by the banks was deposited into Copytech's accounts.9
After discovering this scheme, the Government indicted Wells and Steele 9 7 on one count each of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371,98 alleging the two men had conspired to make material false statements to banks by omitting any reference to the CMP service addenda in their communications with the banks.9 The Government also charged Wells and Steele with four counts of making material false statements to a financial institution in 90 Id. 97 Russell entered into a plea agreement with the Government before trial and testified against Wells and Steele. See Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997) (No. 95-1228) .
"18 U.S.C. § 371 reads in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1997 In their own defense, Wells and Steele asserted that omission of information cannot be a false statement, that the information was not technically "false" because it was literally true, and that withholding the CMP service addenda from the banks was not material. 0 4 As to the false statement charge, Wells and Steele admitted they had forged their wives' signatures but claimed to have done so with the authority, or at least a good faith belief in their authority, to do so. 05 At the end of the trial, the district court instructed the jury that the elements of the offense of making a false statement to a bank are: (1) that the bank was federally insured; (2) that the defendants knowingly made, or caused to be made, a false statement to the bank; and (3) that the defendants made that false statement for the purpose of convincing the bank to purchase lease contracts' 6 At the Government's request, and despite defense objection, the court further instructed the jury that withholding a material fact rendered a statement or representation false, and defined a material fact as one "that would be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to engage or not to engage in a particular transaction." 0 7 The defendants contended that materiality was an issue for the jury to decide, while the Government argued that it was an issue for the judge.' 8 Following Eighth Circuit precedent,"' the judge agreed with the Government and deemed the defendants' '0' Brief for Respondents at 6, Wells (No. 95-1228) . See supra note 9 for the perti- While the defendants' appeal to the Eighth Circuit was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Gaudin,"1 which held that when materiality is an element of the offense, it is an issue for the jury to decide. 4 The Eighth Circuit requested that the Government and Wells and Steele submit supplemental briefs on the applicability of the Gaudin ruling. 5 Wells and Steele argued that, pursuant to Gaudin, materiality is an element of § 1014 on which they were constitutionally entitled to a jury's determination. 6 The Government argued, for the first time, that materiality is not an element of the offense as defined in § 1014."1 The Eighth Circuit concluded, consistent with precedent, that materiality is an element of § 1014,118 and therefore vacated the convictions, remanding the case to the district court for a new trial." 9 The Government appealed the Eighth Circuit decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 120 to decide whether materiality is an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank. proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 12 2 As a threshold matter, Justice Souter ruled that neither the Government's initial indictment of Wells and Steele for making false and "material" statements to a federally insured bank, nor the Government's requested jury instructions regarding materiality at the conclusion of the trial, precluded the Government from questioning (or the Court from addressing) the issue of whether materiality is an element of the offense. 2 Justice Souter then determined that the materiality of a false statement or report made to a federally insured bank is not an element under § 1014.124 Finally, Justice Souter dismissed as unavailing the defendants' remaining arguments for affirming the Eighth Circuit's opinion.
The Court's Ability to Address the Issue of Materiality
Justice Souter ruled that the Court properly could address whether materiality of falsehood is an element of the offense codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1014.126 Respondents Wells and Steele advanced two arguments against the Court's determination of whether materiality is an element of § 1014.12' First, they contended that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30128 foreclosed the Government's position on appeal that materiality is not an element.'9 Justice Souter rejected this argument by noting that the Government was not challenging the jury instruction in an attempt to assign error to the trial court.
130
Instead, the Government was asserting that its proposed instruction was "harmless surplusage," which had not affected the jury's deliberations. Second, Wells and Steele advanced the "law of the case" 1 3 2 and "invited error" 133 doctrines to support their claim that the Court was precluded from addressing the materiality issue. 1 3 Justice Souter acknowledged that several appellate courts have held that the "law of the case" doctrine prevents the Government from denying on appeal that a crime includes an element if the Government accepted instructions at trial which included a fact as an element of the offense.' Justice Souter also noted that the respondents were correct to assert that several appellate courts do not allow parties to complain on appeal about errors that the parties themselves invited or provoked the district court to commit.Y 6 However, Justice Souter determined that neither of these doctrines is sufficient to overcome the Court's traditional rule of reviewing all issues presented in a petition for certiorari, so long as each issue is " 'pressed [in] or passed on' by the Court of Appeals.' 3 7 Because the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of a false statement's materiality as an element of § 1014, the Government was allowed to argue that issue before the Court.' Furthermore, when the Government drafted its indictment and jury instructions, it believed there was evidence sufficient to satisfy the Eighth Circuit's materiality requirement.' 3 9 Only after the Gaudin decision did the Government have any reason to contest the need to demonstrate materiality; if materiality was not an element of the offense, the entire issue was moot. 140 Justice Souter therefore concluded that the Government was not disqualified from arguing the materiality issue before the Court. 41 "2 According to justice Souter, under the law of the case doctrine, "when the Government accepts jury instructions treating a fact as an element of an offense, the... doctrine precludes the Government from denying on appeal that the crime includes the element." Id. Id, at 925.
The Materiality Issue
Having set forth the Court's authority to hear the issue, Justice Souter discussed whether materiality is an element of a violation of § 1014.142 First, Justice Souter looked to the text of § 1014,11 and noted that the language of the statute does not require the subject of the false statement or report to be material to the application.
4
Rather, § 1014 criminalizes any false statement made to a federally insured bank. 45 Justice Souter further noted that the term "false statement" in § 1014 carries with it no "general suggestion of influential significance." 4 6 Accordingly, Justice Souter determined that, under a natural reading of the text of § 1014, materiality is not an element of the crime of making false statements to a federally insured lending institution.
7
Second, Justice Souter addressed the respondents' contention that "false statement" possesses a common law implication of materiality which was incorporated into § 1014 upon codification. 48 Justice Souter acknowledged that some common law crimes involving false statements contained a materiality element. " 9 Congress, however, codified those common law crimes in other sections of the federal criminal code and explicitly included materiality provisions 5 Section 1014 itself consolidated thirteen previous statutory provisions relating to making false statements to financial institutions, which Congress did not include among the federal crimes containing a materiality element.1 5 1 Justice Souter noted that, although "false statement" and "misrepresentation" were similar at common law, and "misrepresentation" had been held to contain a materiality element, [Vol. 88
FALSE STATEMENT PROSECUTIONS
it does not necessarily follow that both terms are identical in containing an implicit materiality requirement. 5 Third, Justice Souter reviewed the statute's legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend for § 1014 to contain a materiality element. 53 Only three of thirteen earlier statutes aggregated in § 1014 had an express materiality requirement, while ten of the earlier provisions had no such requirement.' Justice Souter concluded that "[t]he most likely inference in these circumstances is that Congress deliberately dropped the term 'materiality' without intending materiality to be an element of § 1014.",5 To reach this conclusion, Justice Souter relied upon Kay v. United States, which examined one of the predecessor statutes of § 1014.156 In Kay, the Court determined that it is irrelevant whether the statements made to a bank actually would influence the bank's decision to make a loan. 57 Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the statements are false and are intended to mislead the lending institution. 1 5 8 Justice Souter interpreted Kay as holding that materiality is not an implied element of the offense of making false statements to a bank. 9 Because the Kay decision was announced a decade before Congress consolidated the statute at issue in Kay with twelve other statutes to create § 1014, Justice Souter assumed that Congress intended § 1014 to be read in conformity with the Court's decision in Kay.'0 Therefore, Justice Souter concluded that it was unlikely Congress viewed a materiality requirement as an implicit element of the § 1014 offense. 6 
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some appellate court holdings that materiality is an element of § 1014, Justice Souter warned that "finding any interpretive help in congressional behavior here is impossible." 163 Although Congress had not rejected those decisions when otherwise amending § 1014, it never disturbed the original phraseology of § 1014 specifically to include materiality. 164 Justice Souter believed "'it is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law. ' '' 5 In the present circumstances, Justice Souter found the respondents' argument particularly unconvincing because judicial opinion was divided on the issue of materiality.166 Furthermore, the Court had not described materiality as an element of § 1014 when considering the statute in earlier cases.
167
Next, Justice Souter rejected the respondents' reliance on the Reviser's Note to argue that § 1014 implicitly contains a materiality element.' 6 Justice Souter dismissed as "simply wrong" the Reviser's assertion that Congress's consolidation of thirteen statutory provisions into § 1014 "was without change of substance."' 69 Dropping the materiality requirement from the consolidated statute represented a significant change from three of the predecessor statutes.1 7 0 Justice Souter based his conclusion upon the respondents' failure to cite "a single case holding that any of the predecessor statutes lacking a materiality requirement implicitly contained one," and Congress' inability to assume an implicit materiality requirement in the wake of the Court's decision in Kay.' 7 Third, Justice Souter denied the respondents' assertion that materiality should be read into §1014 to avoid punishing rela- .a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. 404 U. S. 336, 347-48 (1971) Because Kay was not directly on point, Justice Stevens reasoned, it was of no use in determining the proper scope of § 1014.ss Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justice Souter's interpretation of the history of § 1014.186 Specifically, Justice Stevens believed the revisers of § 1014 were correct in asserting that there had been no change of substance when Congress created § 1014287 Citing two pre-consolidation cases which held or assumed that the nonexplicit § 1014 predecessor statutes contained materiality requirements,ss Justice Stevens argued that the revisers reasonably could have assumed that the newly codified § 1014 implicitly contained a materiality element.'9 In support of his conclusion that the revisers' omission of an express reference to materiality was not a "change of substance," Justice Stevens enumerated three additional points: (1) the common law assumed a materiality requirement in crimes involving false statements, which the Court has previously recognized;' 9 0 (2) it is "farfetched" that Congress made a deliberate decision to include or to omit a materiality requirement every ... Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 932 (Stevens,J., dissenting). '"Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). 184 Id. at 933 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 185 Id. at 932 (Stevens,J., dissenting). ' TM Id. at 933 (Stevens.,J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that "a more plausible explanation" was that "the reviser was, in fact, correct." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) . was reasonable for Congress and the revisers to assume that the courts would continue to assume the existence of the materiality requirement that had been a routine aspect of common law false statement litigation. 19 2 In closing, Justice Stevens characterized the Court's textual analysis of § 1014 as unconvincing and overly broad.
9 3 As a result, Justice Stevens argued that the majority expanded the reach of §1014 well beyond its common law antecedents.)' According to Justice Stevens, the Court's reasoning did not justify the conclusion that Congress intended to make immaterial false statements a felony. 9 5
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court reached the wrong conclusion in United States v. Wells for several reasons. First, the Court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 promotes absurd prosecutions, a result Congress certainly did not intend and one that ignores an accepted cannon of statutory interpretation.'9 The Court implicitly addressed the interpretation issue in Williams, a case the Court inadequately considered when deciding Wells1 9 7 Additionally, many of the assumptions upon which the Wells Court relied are incorrect. The Kay 98 decision does not offer the sup-"' Id. at 936 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens considered it far more likely that Congress assumed a materiality requirement would be implied wherever it was not explicit. Id (Stevens,J, dissenting).
2 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, that the vast majority of federal judges subsequently found an implicit materiality requirement in § 1014 confirmed this assumption. Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting) .
Id. at 937 (StevensJ, dissenting). Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that the majority's interpretation of § 1014 made a broad range of unremarkable conduct, such as disingenuously flattering a bank officer about his choice of a bow tie, a violation of federal law. Furthermore, the Court made unfounded empirical judgments that false statements are usually not about trivial matters, and that the Government rarely would be able to prove that nonmaterial statements were made for the purpose of influencing a decision. Id-(StevensJ., dissenting).
'Id. (StevensJ, dissenting Trucking decision directs a court to go further than the literal words of a statute.°3 When construing a statute, a court also must look to the potential result of that construction.
20 4 If the interpretation will lead to an absurd result, the court should look to the purpose of the statute .2 Even if the result is not absurd, but merely unreasonable, sometimes the court must adhere to the underlying purpose of a statute rather than the literal words.
2 6
Had Justice Souter followed precedent established in American Trucking and its forebears, he undoubtedly would have reached a more reasonable conclusion in Wells. Furthermore, the Court may not pick and choose among its precedents. 0 7 The American Trucking decision clearly delineated the path the Court should have followed when giving a statute a natural reading. Because the Court did not follow precedent, the result is a conclusion which can only be described as absurd. The only false statement count on which the defendants in Wells ultimately were convicted alleged that Wells and Steele had signed their wives' signature on personal loan guarantees. The jury convicted the two men on that charge only after hearing ajury instruction that such conduct was "material. 213 Surely Congress did not mean to equate such a common practice with felonious conduct, particularly in a situation where the defendants had a good faith belief in their authority to do so. 214 Yet, the Wells Court concluded that Congress meantjust that. 215 In arriving at the conclusion that there is no materiality requirement under § 1014, the Court ignored its own precedent and misconstrued congressional intent. While Justice Souter correctly stated that the Court had "previously described the elements of § 1014 without any mention of materiality" in the Williams case, 1 6 he ignored the Court's strong reluctance to criminalize trivial behavior. 217 The Williams Court recognized that making "a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable con- United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 932 (1997) (Stevens,J, dissenting 
Ramifications of the Wells Holding
The impact of the Wells decision extends far beyond future § 1014 prosecutions. At its most basic, the Court's holding in Wells means that courts may not imply a materiality requirement in any federal false statement statute that lacks an explicit materiality requirement. 220 Some of these false statement statutes clearly do not call for a materiality requirement, because there would be no opportunity for a person to supply immaterial false information.2 For example, it is a crime to willfully and knowingly make a false statement in a passport application. Citizens may apply for a passport only by completing a specific application form, which requires the applicant to provide a wide range of personal information all of which is material to the determination that the applicant is a United States citizen entitled to a passport. 223 Therefore, there is no need for this statute to contain an explicit materiality requirement.
224
On the other hand, § 1014 provides an unusually outrageous example of the types of immaterial behavior that are now federal offenses. 
Id.
SSee supra text accompanying note 211.
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For example, a dairy company that advertises its milk products as "creamy and delicious" is now federally criminally liable if through an objective determination that claim is proven to be false. 226 In another example, a person applying for workers' compensation benefits who makes a false statement may be held criminally liable, regardless of the relevancy of his statement.
227
Neither of these provisions contains an explicit materiality requirement. Yet, as a result of the Court's decision in Wells, such statements are now federal criminal offenses because courts may not read a materiality requirement into a statute that lacks such a requirement. The number of false statement crimes has grown exponentially, and now includes virtually every statement imaginable in the context of transactions governed by these anti-fraud provisions. It is highly unlikely that Congress intended all such behavior to constitute a crime. 28 Justice Souter did not seriously address the consequence that absurd cases might be prosecuted under the Court's expansive reading of § 1014.2 Indeed, Justice Souter argued that a literal reading of the statute would not take § 1014 beyond the scope that a materiality requirement would impose.2 0 Unfortunately that is not true: A literal application of § 1014 would authorize the prosecution of false statements that are not material.2' In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Court, quite correctly, did not rely upon the discretion of prosecutors to avoid frivolous prosecutions. 232 Rather than offering a realistic or compelling means of ensuring that absurd cases will not be prosecuted, however, the Court "made an empirical judgment that false statements will not 'usually' be about a trivial matter.,
33
The Court did not address those apparently rare instances in which an immaterial false statement was made for the See7 U.S.C. § 6407(e) (1994) (barring "false or unwarranted statements" regarding fluid milk products).
See 33 U.S.C. § 931 (1994) (penalizing false statements for purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefit). Contrary to Justice Souter's conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in Kay v. United States2 does not preclude a determination that there is an implied materiality element in § 1014 for two reasons. First, the Kay Court did not address whether materiality was an implicit element of the offense of making false statements under the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a) .237 Instead, the Court determined that providing false information to a bank is a crime regardless of whether the bank ultimately relies upon that false information to make its decision on a loan application2 8 While the Court correctly presumed that Congress follows Supreme Court holdings,2 9 the Court incorrectly concluded that, because of the Kay decision, "Congress could not... assume[] that a materiality element was implicit in a comparable statute that was silent on the issue." 240 Because the Court did not directly address materiality in Kay, Congress had no reason to believe that courts would not continue to imply an absent materiality requirement in the newlycreated § 1014. Kay, therefore, does not stand in the way of a conclusion that Congress deemed an express materiality requirement as redundant.
Second, although the Wells Court stated that "no one reading Kay could reasonably have assumed that criminal falsity presupposed materiality," 24 the Kay Court did, in fact, presuppose materiality when it examined a violation of the Home Owners' Loan Act. 24 
1998]
ply assumed that prosecutions under false statement statutes would proceed only in instances where the allegedly false statements were material to the loan application.2
The Kreidler court assumed that an immaterial false statement would be insufficient to support a charge of violating the statute." The McClanahan court did not address the materiality issue because there was no doubt that the false statements made by the defendant were material. 6 The McClanahan court did, however, determine that if "the false statements charged and proved were wholly frivolous and unrelated, it would in all probability be concluded that that they did not supply the basis for a prosecution" under the statute at issue.25 The Kreidler and McClanahan decisions thus clearly demonstrate that courtg were routinely implying a materiality element under predecessors to § 1014.
More importantly, however, these cases make insupportable several of the propositions advanced by the Wells Court. The Kreidler and McClanahan decisions directly rebutJustice Souter's contention that Congress could not have assumed that a materiality element is implied in a statute silent on the issue.
8 Furthermore, the Kay decision did not preclude Congress from assuming that a materiality element is implicit. 25 9 In fact, Congress could have assumed the exact opposite: there is no need for an explicit materiality requirement because courts routinely 260 imply such an element when addressing false statement cases. Because courts implied a materiality element in predecessor statutes, it was wholly proper for the Reviser of § 1014 to regard the consolidation of thirteen statutes into one statute without an express materiality provision as a "consolidation without change of substance." 26 '
That the implied materiality elements in
Kreidler and McClanahan were not appealed lends credence to the theory that implication of a materiality element was a widely In United States v. Wells, the Supreme Court incorrectly determined that materiality is not an element of the offense of making a false statement to a federally insured bank. First, the Court should have invoked the absurd result principle to draw a distinct boundary between criminal and non-criminal behavior. The Court should have taken a results-oriented approach to the decision and recognized that its holding has the effect of federally criminalizing trivial behavior. The Court could have avoided this problem only by concluding that materiality was an implicit element of the offense. Furthermore, the Court should have examined its precedents and the history of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 to determine that materiality was routinely assumed to be an element of § 1014's predecessor statutes. As a result of the Court's decision, inconsequential behavior is now punishable by draconian penalties.
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